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In this paper we analyze the structure of contest equilibria with a variable number of 
individuals. First we analyze a situation where the total prize depends on the number of agents 
and where every single agent faces opportunity costs of investing in the contest. Second we 
analyze a situation where the agents face a trade-off between productive and appropriative 
investments. Here, the number of agents may also influence the productivity of productive 
investments. It turns out that both types of contests may lead to opposing results concerning 
the optimal number of individuals depending on the strength of size effects. Whereas in the 
former case individual utility is u-shaped when the number of agents increases, the opposite 
holds true for the latter case. We discuss the implications of our findings for the case of 
anarchic societies and competition on markets. 
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In this paper we analyze the voluntary interaction of agents in economic environments
that can be characterized as a contest. In a contest, each agent faces a trade-oﬀ
between productive and appropriative activities, and individual behavior depends on
the number of agents involved. A change in the size of the group has two eﬀects on
the individual perception of the economic environment. First, the individual impact
on the outcome of the contest becomes smaller if the group size increases. Second, an
increase in the group size may have an inﬂuence on the total amount of goods that can
be distributed. These size eﬀects can be decomposed as follows. We call any eﬀect of
group size on the total amount of goods rent eﬀect and on the individual investments in
appropriation appropriation eﬀect. Rent eﬀects are zero if the total amount of goods is
independent of the size of the group. We are interested in the connection between group
size and the structure of contest equilibria. Does an increase in the group size make the
members of the group more or less aggressive? What group size maximizes individual,
what group size aggregate utility? It turns out that the answers to these questions
depend on the quantitative importance of rent eﬀects as well as on the eﬀectiveness of
appropriative activities.
In addition to its general interest, the analysis of the inﬂuence of group size on the
structure of equilibria in contests with size eﬀects can be motivated by means of two
examples. First, it is one of the most important results in economic theory that an
increase in the number of economic agents interacting with each other is potentially
welfare-improving because it allows for the specialization of individuals according to
their comparative advantages. We capture this idea with our assumption that rent
eﬀects exist. These eﬀects, however, only potentially increase aggregate utility and do
not necessarily translate into actual well-being of the society. The actual gain depends
on the ability of agents to impose transaction costs on other members of the society, and
this ability may depend on technological as well as demographic variables. For example
anthropologists argue that initially anarchic hunter-gatherer societies were confronted
with an increasing potential for aggression due to an increase in population density
(e.g., Diamond 1997). The resulting increase in appropriative and defensive behavior
made anarchic societies increasingly ineﬀective.1 We use a model which incorporates
1Economists have recently started to analyze the extent of conﬂict and cooperation and the emer-
gence of institutions in anarchic situations where unstable property rights create an impetus for the
development of alternative ways to organize life, resulting in the emergence of chiefdoms, or more
1both the positive and negative eﬀects of an increasing population in order to gain
deeper insight into the relationship between contest structure and population size. Our
results show that an increase in population size does not necessarily lead to an increase
in aggressiveness in the society. The development of aggressiveness rather depends on
the magnitude of rent eﬀects as well as on the relevant tradeoﬀs the individuals face.
Second, there exist markets which have the structure of a contest, even in modern
societies with well-deﬁned and enforced property rights. Competition for customers
through advertising can create the formal analogy to the appropriation of goods in
anarchy.2 In addition, a market place often is the more attractive for customers the
larger is the number of competitors supplying on this market place. When the total
gross proﬁt that can be earned is increasing in the number of competitors supplying
on the market, then rent eﬀects exist.
In order to analyze the consequences of group size on the outcome of the contest
we discuss two generic forms of contests, both belonging to the class of ‘common-
pool’ problems (Grossman 2001). In the ﬁrst contest, the total prize that can be
distributed among agents is ﬁxed and depends only on the group size. Investment
in the appropriation of the prize, however, incurs a cost for the agents that can be
thought of as resulting from a labor-leisure choice, or, more generally, opportunity
costs of alternative uses of time. In the second contest, the total prize depends on the
amount of time invested in productive activities as well as on the number of agents.
The basic trade-oﬀ is between appropriative and productive activities.
Both contests diﬀer with respect to the source of economic welfare as well as with
respect to the magnitude of appropriable individual resources. In the ﬁrst contest, an
increase in the number of individuals has a positive impact on the total amount of
goods that can be distributed, and there exists an individual resource (‘leisure’) that
is not due to appropriation by other individuals. In the second contest, the number
of agents has an inﬂuence on the marginal productivity of production, however, there
are no goods to be distributed without productive investments by the individuals. The
total time endowment of an agent has either to be devoted to productive activities,
generally hierarchic societies (for example Bush and Mayer 1974, Hishleifer 1995, Skaperdas 1992,
Grossman and Kim 1995, Grossman 2001 among others). We extend and complement this work
to gain a better understanding of the economic mechanisms that cause the perceived ineﬃciency of
anarchy.
2See Bell, Keeney, and Little (1975), Schmalensee (1976), and Monahan (1987).
2which are used for the production of a good that can then be appropriated by other
agents, or to appropriation.
This paper diﬀers from the previous work on contests because it explicitly allows
for size eﬀects and extends the analysis of group size to the two diﬀerent types of
common-pool contests. Standard contest models either assume that the total prize is
ﬁxed and agents compete for the share they get (Nti 1998), or that competitors can
either invest in production, which increases the size of the rent, or in appropriation,
which increases their share (Grossman and Kim 1995, Skaperdas 1992). Closest to our
analysis is Hirshleifer (1995), who analyzes a variant of the ﬁrst contest for the cases
of absent and constant size eﬀects.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the model. We derive the results
in Section 3 and conclude in Section 4.
2 The model
Consider an anarchic society or group with n ≥ 2 identical individuals indexed by i.
We will analyze two diﬀerent scenarios, one in which the individuals are endowed with
a certain quantity of the consumption good and one where the consumption good has
to be produced. Individuals compete for the ﬁnal distribution in each scenario. The
two types of contest share the property that the initial endowment of the consumption
good (contest 1) or the individual production (contest 2) does not aﬀect the ability
to appropriate or defend. Hence, we analyze a common-pool contest (Grossman 2001)
where we do not have to distinguish between defensive and appropriative activities
explicitly.
Our primary interest is to gain a better understanding of how the contest structure
and the number of agents inﬂuence individual behavior in the contest. In order to do so
we distinguish between two diﬀerent tradeoﬀs the individuals face when making their
decisions.
Contest 1: In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation we assume that the individuals can either engage
in the appropriation of a rent of size R, or consume leisure, fi.3 The total rent R
3The term leisure is only a ﬁll-in for any activity that generates utility and that is not challenged
by other individuals. In a classical rent-seeking contest this activity can for example be the investment
in a perfectly secure project with a return that is normalized to be equal to one.
3depends on the number of individuals, n, in the following way: R(n,g,Z) = ngZ,
g ∈ [0,2],4 where g measures the inﬂuence of the number of individuals on the total
quantity of the rent, and Z > 0 is an arbitrary parameter. This speciﬁcation generalizes
the typical rent-seeking contest (Tullock 1980) that has been applied to the analysis of
anarchic situations by, among others, Grossman (2001).
Contest 2: In a second speciﬁcation we assume that the individuals can either engage
in the appropriation of a rent or in the production of this rent. The total quantity of the
rent, R, is a function of productive investments li: R(n,g,l1,...,ln) = n(g−1) Pn
j=1 lj,
g ∈ [0,2].5 As before, g measures the eﬀect of a change in the number of individuals
on their ability to produce.6
Irrespective of the above speciﬁcation, each individual can invest ai ≥ 0 units of
time to appropriate part of the rent. The fraction pi of the rent that is appropriated







where b ∈ [0,1] is the decisiveness parameter (Hirshleifer 1995) of the CSF. From (1),
investments do not change the fraction of the prize appropriated by competitors in
the special case where b → 0, and the marginal eﬀectiveness of appropriation has a
maximum if b = 1 (Hirshleifer 1995). Thus, other things being equal larger values of b
tend to increase the level of investment in the contest.
4The restriction to g ∈ 0,2 captures all qualitatively relevant scenarios as will become clear in the
course of the following discussion.
5With one exception, using a Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation would not change the qualitative nature
of the results. The exception is that with a Cobb-Douglas technology, or more generally with a
production technology that has the property R(n,g,l1,...,ln) = 0 ⇔ ∃li = 0 a full-conﬂict equilibrium
l1 = ... = ln = 0 always exists in addition to an interior equilibrium. For details see Skaperdas (1992).
6In order to have a similar interpretation of the parameter g for both contests we have normalized
the power of n to be equal to g − 1 because, in contest 1, g = 0 implies that the total rent is
independent of the number of individuals. With a linear production technology, potential production
would be linear in the number of individuals if the power of n is equal to zero. A constant total
potential production with respect to the number of individuals therefore requires a division by the
factor n. A consequence of this normalization is that for g < 1 output is reduced if the same aggregate
input is provided by a larger number of individuals. This case corresponds to situations where more
individuals actually hinder each other in the production of goods.
4We assume that individuals are risk neutral.7 Consider the case where n increase in
appropriation by one unit reduces leisure by the same amount, which gives rise to the
time constraint ai +fi = 1. The objective function of an individual in the ﬁrst contest
can then be written as ui (·) = pi (·)ngZ −ai, and the objective function in the second
contest is ui (·) = pi (·)n(g−1) Pn
j=1(1 − aj). We consider Nash equilibria of the games.
In contest 1 individual i chooses ai to solve the following problem:
max
ai
ui (a1,...,an) = pi (a1,...,an)n
gZ − ai, (2)




gZ = 1, i = 1,...,n. (3)
Hence, at the individual optimum the marginal increase in the fraction of the rent
appropriated by individual i (LHS) has to be equal to the marginal costs caused by an
increase in ai, which is equal to 1 (RHS).
In contest 2 individual i solves:
max
ai




(1 − aj), (4)








(g−1), i = 1,...,n. (5)
The marginal increase in the appropriated rent (LHS) has to be equal to the marginal
costs of appropriation (RHS). The marginal costs consist of the loss of total production
times the fraction that is appropriated by the individual.
The simultaneous solution of the optimization problems gives rise to a unique and
symmetric Nash equilibrium in both contests. Contest 1 yields the following equilib-
7As a consequence we do not have to distinguish between the interpretation of pi as being a share
of the prize or as being a probability of winning the whole prize. See Cornes and Hartley (2003) for
a detailed discussion.
5rium appropriative activity, a(n,b,g,Z), indirect utility, v(n,b,g,Z), and aggregate
utility, W(n,b,g,Z):
a = b(n − 1)n
g−2Z ∀i, v = (n − (n − 1)b)n
g−2Z ∀i, W = (n − (n − 1)b)n
g−1Z. (6)
Analogously we get the following equilibrium appropriative activity, a(n,b,g), indirect
utility, v(n,b,g), and aggregate utility, W(n,b,g), for contest 2:
a =
(n − 1)b
1 + b(n − 1)
∀i, v =
ng−1
1 + b(n − 1)
∀i, W =
ng
1 + b(n − 1)
. (7)
3 Analysis of size eﬀects
3.1 Contest 1
We ﬁrst analyze the inﬂuence of g on the equilibrium investment in the contest, indirect
utility, and aggregate utility. Diﬀerentiating (6) gives ∂a/∂g > 0,∂v/∂g > 0 and
∂W/∂g > 0 for all meaningful values of n. In order to understand the intuition for these
properties note that an increase in g is equivalent to an increase in the prize Z. It is
seen from (6) that a, v and W are proportional to Z. This makes intuitive that a higher
level of g (or Z) is followed by an increase in appropriative activities, indirect utility
and aggregate utility.8 Since the marginal costs of appropriative activities are ﬁxed to
be equal to one, investments in the contest become comparatively more attractive with
an increase in g. Moreover, the additional marginal prize is less than fully dissipated
by the increase in investments. As a consequence, despite the fact that the individuals
become more aggressive, the increase in aggressiveness does not imply a reduction of
individual utility or aggregate utility.
8We are grateful to one of the referees for suggesting this argumentation.
6We can then discuss the eﬀects of an increase of the number of competitors on a,
v, and W. From (6):
∂a
∂n


























= (gn − b(1 − g + ng))n
g−2Z. (8c)
To interpret (8) consider the benchmark case g = 0. In this case a is decreasing in
the number of individuals. The reason is that an increase in n reduces the marginal
gain of appropriation. In the limit for n → ∞ we get a → 0, individual appropriation
activities converge to zero. At the same time, aggregate investment in the contest, na,
does increase with n and has a limit of bZ for n → ∞. This ﬁnding shows that an in-
crease in group size need not imply an increase in the potential for individual aggression
(because of constant marginal costs and reduced marginal revenues of appropriation),
but unambiguously increases the total amount of resources devoted to appropriation
(because more individuals devote resources to appropriation). The positive eﬀect of a
reduction of per-capita investments in the contest cannot over-compensate the negative
eﬀect resulting from an increased group size, given the absence of size eﬀects.
Let us allow for size eﬀects now. An interesting scenario, which is based on previous
work by Grossman (2001) for an arbitrary but ﬁxed number of competitors, is the
case where the marginal size eﬀect attributed to an additional competitor is constant.











= (1 − b)Z > 0.
Competition increases investment in the contest. Competitors become more aggressive
if b > 0. The intuition is that the marginal return from an investment in aggression
increases if aggregate utility is rising, causing a reduction of individual utility: there
exists a discrepancy between the interest of the single individual and the interest of
the whole society. If, however, b = 0 and individuals cannot inﬂuence the distribution
of the rent, then aggregate utility is unambiguously increasing in n, whereas individual
utility is independent of group size.



















Figure 1: The eﬀects of a change in g and n on appropriation activities in contest 1
(b = 0.5).
A comparison of the above cases shows that the general eﬀect of a change in n
depends in a non-trivial way on b and g. We start discussing the general case with an
analysis of investment levels:
Result 1. a. If b = 0, ∂a/∂n = 0.
b. If b > 0 and g ≥ 1, ∂a/∂n > 0.
c. If b > 0 and g < 1, ∂a/∂n R 0 ⇔ n R (2 − g)/(1 − g).
Proof: Part a. of the result follows from (8a) at b = 0. To prove parts b. and c.,
let b > 0. For g = 1, ∂a/∂n = bZng−2 > 0. Note that ∂a/∂n > 0 if and only if
n(1−g) < 2−g. The inequality always holds for g > 1. For g < 1 it holds if and only
if n < (2−g)/(1−g). The RHS approaches inﬁnity for g → 1 and 2 for g → 0. Hence,
∂a/∂n depends on the relationship between n and g and the borderline is deﬁned by
n = (2 − g)/(1 − g). ￿
The economic intuition for the result is as follows. A larger number of individuals
implies that the prize has to be shared among a larger group. Given constant marginal
costs, investments in the contest are proﬁtable for b > 0 if the negative eﬀect of sharing
the prize between more individuals is over-compensated by a positive rent eﬀect. This
implies that n has to be ﬁnite. If n becomes inﬁnite, the marginal eﬀect of a single
competitor becomes negligible. However, increased competition tends to reduce per-
capita investments in the contest in cases where the rent eﬀect is small relative to
8the eﬀect of sharing among a larger group. Result 1 therefore shows that it is not
the eﬀect of increased competition that makes the individuals more aggressive, but the
existence of suﬃcient rent eﬀects. This result highlights Diamond’s (1997) claim that
population pressure increases the ineﬃciencies of anarchy from a diﬀerent perspective:
if an essential aspect of anarchy is captured by contest 1, it is not the existence of
population pressure per se that increases the potential for aggression in the society,
but the implied rent eﬀects.
Figure 1 gives a graphical representation of Result 1 for the case b = 0.5. In
the ﬁgure g is measured along the abscissa, and n is measured along the ordinate.
Investments in the contest are decreasing for all points above the dividing line ∂a/∂n =
0 and increasing for all points below. Higher values of g intensify the aggressiveness of
the individuals. However, if g < 1 then an increase in the number of individuals will
ﬁnally temper the aggressiveness in the contest.
To discuss the eﬀect of a change in the number of competitors on aggregate util-
ity, W, it is useful to formally decompose (8c) in a rent eﬀect and an appropriation
eﬀect. The rent eﬀect, RE = (dR/dn)/ng−2 = gnZ, is unambiguously positive, increas-
ing in n, and has a slope equal to gZ, starting at 2gZ since n ≥ 2. The appropriation
eﬀect, AE = (∂(na)/∂n)/ng−2 = b(1 − g + ng)Z, is unambiguously increasing with a
slope that is equal to bgZ, but depending on whether 2g/(1+g) R b it is starting below
or above the graph of the rent eﬀect. The slope of the rent eﬀect exceeds the slope
of the appropriation eﬀect. Figure 2 portrays both eﬀects. In the ﬁgure, n is drawn
along the abscissa whereas the rent and the appropriation eﬀects are drawn along the
ordinate. The two lines intersect if b and g are such that ¯ n = b(1 − g)/g(1− b) ≥ 2 as
in point A. This scenario describes a situation where aggregate utility is u-shaped in n,
whereas aggregate utility is increasing in n in the case where b(1 − g)/g(1 − b) < 2.
In order to make this intuition precise let us aggregate the appropriation eﬀect and
the rent eﬀect. This gives b(g − 1) + ng(1 − b), and the sign of this term determines
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A
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2gZ
Figure 2: Impact of the rent eﬀect (RE) and the appropriation eﬀect (AE) on aggre-
gate utility in contest 1.
Result 2. a. If b = g = 0 , or b = g = 1, ∂W
∂n = 0.
b. If g ∈ (0,1) and b ∈ [0,
2g
1+g], or g = 1 and b ∈ [0,1], or g ∈ (1,2]
and b ∈ [0,1], ∂W
∂n > 0.
c. If g = 0 and b ∈ (0,1), or g ∈ (0,1) and b = 1, ∂W
∂n < 0.
d. If g ∈ (0,1) and (i) b ∈ [
2g
1+g,1), ∂W
∂n = 0 ⇔ n =
b(1−g)
g(1−b),
(ii) b ∈ (
2g
1+g,1), ∂W
∂n ≷ 0 ⇔ 2 ≤ n ≷
b(1−g)
g(1−b).
Proof: The result follows directly from (8c), where we note that ∂W/∂n R 0 ⇔ gn(1−
b) R b(1 − g). Reformulating the latter condition yields n R ¯ n = b(1 − g)/(g(1 − b)).
In addition, it follows from this condition that ¯ n ≥ 2 if and only if b ≥ 2g/(1 + g). ￿
Result 2 demonstrates that an increase in the number of individuals does increase
aggregate utility if g > 1 or if the number of individuals is suﬃciently large. The rent
eﬀect over-compensates every increase in appropriation if n increases. The intuition
for this ﬁnding is closely related to the intuition for the change in a. First, the prize
increases over-proportionally with the number of competitors at g > 1. This makes
competitors more aggressive, but the increase in output is not fully dissipated by the
increase in a. Second, an additional agent still adds to the total prize even though
the rent increases underproportionally with n in the case where g ∈ (0,1). Here, the
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Figure 3: Impact of the rent eﬀect (RE) and the appropriation eﬀect (AE) on aggre-
gate utility in contest 1.
among a larger group. In the extreme case g = 0, an increase in n reduces the marginal
eﬀectiveness of appropriation from the point of view of a single agent. As a result the
agent reduces appropriation, ∂a/∂n = (2 − n)bZ/n3 ≤ 0 from (8a). Hence, there
must exist a critical level of g where both eﬀects exactly cancel, ∂a/∂n = 0 ⇔ g =
(n − 2)/(n − 1).
The result shows that there is a qualitative diﬀerence between models where the rent
is exogenous and models where the rent is endogenous. In a model without rent eﬀects,
aggregate utility is decreasing in the number of competitors, ∂W/∂n = −bZ/n2, and
the slope depends linearly on the discriminatory power of individuals. With suﬃciently
large g, the slope can be positive. We will come back to this point in our discussion of
the optimal number of competitors in the contest.
Next we turn to an analysis of the change in individual net utility v. We follow the
line of argumentation used above and decompose (8b) in a rent eﬀect, RE = (dp/dnR+
pdR/dn)/ng−3 = (g − 1)nZ, and an appropriation eﬀect, AE = (∂a/∂n)/ng−3 =
b(2−g+(g−1)n)Z. Aggregating the rent eﬀect and the appropriation eﬀect, RE−AE,
shows that the sign of (8b) is determined by the sign of (g − 1)n− b(2 − g + (g −1)n.
Figure 3 shows this relationship. If g > 1, the rent-eﬀect curve is increasing in n and
has a slope that is equal to (g − 1)Z, starting at 2(g − 1)Z. The appropriation-eﬀect
curve is also increasing with a slope equal to b(g − 1)Z, starting at bgZ. If g > 1, and
depending on whether 2g/(1+g) R b, it is starting below or above the rent-eﬀect curve.
Because the slope of the rent-eﬀect curve exceeds the slope of the appropriation-eﬀect
11curve it follows immediately that v is either increasing (2g/(1 + g) < b and g > 1), u-
shaped (2g/(1+g) > b and g > 1), or decreasing (all other cases) in n. We summarize
with:
Result 3. a. If g = 1 and b = 0, or g = 2 and b = 1, ∂v
∂n = 0.
b. If b = 0 and g ∈ (1,2], or b ∈ (0,1) and g = 2
2−b, or b ∈ (0,1) and
g ∈ ( 2
2−b,2], ∂v
∂n > 0.
c. If b = 0 and g ∈ [0,1), or b = 1 and g ∈ [0,2), or b ∈ (0,1) and
g ∈ [0,1], ∂v
∂n < 0.
d. If b ∈ (0,1) and (i) g ∈ (1, 2
2−b], ∂v
∂n = 0 ⇔ n =
b(2−g)
(g−1)(1−b),
(ii) g ∈ (1, 2
2−b), ∂v
∂n ≷ 0 ⇔ 2 ≤ n ≷
b(2−g)
(g−1)(1−b).
Proof: The result follows directly from (8b), where we note that ∂v/∂n R 0 if and only
if n(1 − g)(b − 1) R b(g − 2) ⇔ n R ¯ nb(2 − g)/((1 − g)(b − 1)). In addition, ¯ n ≥ 2 if
and only if g ≤ 2/(2 − b). ￿
Result 3 implies that an increase in n increases the net utility of the individuals
only for suﬃciently large g, compared to b. The economic intuition for Result 3 is
best understood if (8b) is evaluated at the boundary case where g = 2 and b = 1. At
this point, rent and appropriation eﬀects balance in a way that net utility is constant.
The contest is less eﬀective from the perspective of an individual trying to increase its
share of the rent for low values of b, which implies that the individuals reduce their
aggressiveness. In equilibrium this increases individual utility. By the same token,
individual utility decreases if size eﬀects are less important.9
An interesting implication of Result 3 is that for g > 1 individual utility is not
monotonous in the population. It is decreasing up to a critical number of individuals
and increasing thereafter. If n is relatively small, the negative appropriation eﬀect of an
increase in competition is relatively important and outweighs the rent eﬀect. However,
increasing n implies that the appropriation eﬀect is becoming less important. There
exist pairs of {g,b} such that the appropriation eﬀect is dominated by the rent eﬀect.
This ﬁnding shows that, for example for the case of an anarchic society, the contest
9To determine the slope and curvature of the condition ∂v/∂n = 0 use (8b) to get b = n(g −
1)/((g − 1)n + g − 2). The ﬁrst and second derivatives of this function show that it is increasing and
concave in g for g > 1, which is the relevant domain of g according to Result 3.
























Figure 4: Comparison of changes in aggregate utility and individual utility in con-
test 1 (n = 5).
creates a u-curve eﬀect that may hamper a further development of the society if it
starts at the decreasing region of the v-curve.
A comparison of Result 2 and Result 3 demonstrates that there may exist a quali-
tative diﬀerence between the eﬀects on individual utility and the eﬀects on aggregate
utility of a growing number of individuals. Figure 4 uniﬁes both conditions. The
change in individual and aggregate utility has the same sign for extreme values of b
and g. However, there exists an interval of ‘intermediate’ values for b and g where
the aggregate utility increases but individual utility decreases. The intuition for this
discrepancy is as follows. Recall that W = nv. Thus, ∂W/∂n = v+n∂v/∂n. The ﬁrst
term measures the eﬀect of an additional agent on aggregate utility, which is always
positive. The second term measures the eﬀect of an additional competitor on other
agents. This eﬀect can be either positive or negative. Hence, if the individual utility
is increasing, aggregate utility has to increase by deﬁnition. However, there is a region
for which individual utility is decreasing but this decrease does not over-compensate
the eﬀect that a ‘new’ competitor adds to the aggregate. The former eﬀect is dominant
in cases where g is small and b is large.
A straightforward question is about the optimal number of individuals. There are
two perspectives from which we can determine this number. (i) From the individuals’
perspective it is given by the number of individuals that maximizes net utility. (ii)
From a social point of view the optimal number of competitors maximizes aggregate
13utility. Both measures do not necessarily lead to the same results. We start our
discussion for the case of potential interior solutions. It follows directly from Results
2.d. and 3.d. that any interior solution has to be a minimum both, from the aggregate
and the individual point of view: indirect utility and aggregate utility are decreasing
if n is below a critical level and increasing thereafter. This implies that the optimal
number of agents is either 2 or inﬁnity from both perspectives, depending on g and b.
In order to determine the optimal number of agents we calculate the limit of W and v
for n approaching inﬁnity. We get the following corollary to Result 2:
Corollary 1. a. If b = g = 0 and if b = g = 1, aggregate utility is independent of n.
Net aggregate utility is W = Z.
b. If b = 0 and g > 0 or if b ∈ (0,1) and g ≥ 1, or if b = 1 and g >
1, the aggregate utility maximizing number of agents converges to
inﬁnity. The resulting level of aggregate utility converges to inﬁnity.
c. If b < 1 and g < 1, the aggregate utility maximizing number of
agents converges to inﬁnity. The resulting level of aggregate utility
converges to inﬁnity as well.
d. If b = 1 and g < 1 the aggregate utility maximizing number of
agents is equal to 2, the resulting level of aggregate utility is 2g−1Z.
Proof: Parts a. and b. follow from Result 2 a. to c.. In order to prove parts c. and d.
we have to take the limit of W = (n + (1 − n)b)ng−1Z for n → ∞. It follows that for
b < 1, limn→∞ W is equal to ∞ for g < 1. If b = 1 we get limn→∞W is equal to 0 for
g < 1. On the other hand, W(n = 2) = 2g−1Z. ￿
The above ﬁnding shows that the net eﬀect of an increase in n on aggregate utility
is positive if g is large relative to b, even though large values of g make aggressive
behavior more proﬁtable. The marginal rent eﬀect of an additional agent is increasing,
and this outweighs the costs caused by the increase in appropriative activities.
The fact that we get a corner solution even for relatively small size eﬀects at g < 1
follows from the assumption that size eﬀect are globally decreasing in the number of
agents. As a consequence, the marginal size eﬀect is large in the case where the number
of agents is small and it is small if this number is large, which implies that agents react
diﬀerently, depending on the initial number of agents. For small numbers they increase
appropriation, whereas they reduce appropriation for large n. This explains the u-
14shaped structure of aggregate utility. A maximal number of agents is then optimal if
b < 1 and g > 0 or b = 1 and g > 1.
The eﬀect on individual utility can be summarized as follows.
Corollary 2. a. If g < 1, or if g = 1 and b > 0, or if g ∈ (1,2) and b = 1, the
utility-maximizing number of agents is equal to 2 and the utility
level is equal to 2g−2(2 − b)Z.
b. If g = 1 and b = 0 and if g = 2 and b = 1, the utility level is
independent of the number of agents and equal to Z.
c. If g > 1 and b ∈ [0,1), the utility-maximizing number of agents
converges to ∞. The utility level converges to ∞ as well.
Proof: Parts a., b., and the case b = 0 of part c. follow directly from Result 3. To show
cases b ∈ (0,1) of part c. ﬁrst note that v = 2g−2(2 − b)Z for n = 2, which is a ﬁnite
number. Taking the limit of v for n → ∞ shows that it always converges to ∞.￿
It follows from our previous results that a maximal number of agents is optimal if b < 1
and g > 0 or b = 1 and g > 1. Utility is equal to zero if b ∈ [0,1) and g ∈ [0,1) or if
b = 1 and g ∈ [0,2). An increase in the number of agents tends to reduce utility if g is
relatively small compared to b.
A comparison of Corollaries 1 and 2 reveals that the public and private evaluation
of the optimal number of agents coincides for b ∈ [0,1) and g ∈ (1,2], and b = 1 and
g ∈ [0,1) respectively. They diﬀer for b ∈ [0,1) and g ∈ [0,1], and b = 1 and g ∈ [1,2].
There exists an interesting formal similarity between the literature on the optimal
size of a population and our approach.10 It is a well-established result in the theory of
optimal population size that in a world with ﬁnite resources, sum-utilitarianism implies
an inﬁnite population with arbitrarily low individual utilities. This property of utili-
tarian aggregate utility functions has been called the ‘repugnant conclusion’ by Parﬁt
(1984), see also Razin and Sadka (1995). On the other hand, average utilitarianism
implies a minimal population with maximal individual utility.
The logic of this conclusion abstracts from any institutional details and holds for
the case that the potential rent is independent of the size of the population and not
10We stress that the similarity is a formal one because from a normative point of view the problem to
determine an optimal group size of already living individuals is diﬀerent from determining an optimal
population of individuals who still have to be born. See Dasgupta (1993) for further details.
15dissipated in a contest. Our results can be interpreted in the spirit of the repugnant
conclusion to test its relevance in anarchic environments with positive size eﬀects. For
this purpose let us interpret individual utility, v, as average utilitarianism and aggregate
utility, W, as sum utilitarianism. It is clear that the repugnant conclusion does not
hold in our model as long as g ∈ [0,1). In contrast, the repugnant conclusion holds
when g ∈ (1,2), since then individual utility and aggregate utility converge in opposite
directions. However, in the case where g = 2, individual utility and aggregate utility
one again converge in the same direction. It follows that the logic of the repugnant
conclusion is obtained as a special case in our model. It does apply in cases where
the growth of the potential rent exceeds population growth only moderately, whereas
the repugnant conclusion cannot be obtained when the contestable rent grows at a
slower rate as the number of individuals. The reason is that the dissipation of part of
the potential rent in the contest requires a minimum size eﬀect in order to guarantee
increasing aggregate or individual utilities.11
Let us summarize the most important results we have obtained in this section:
• First, if g ∈ (0,1) and starting at n = 2 an increase in the number of individuals
increases aggressiveness if the population is small and decreases aggressiveness if
it is large. The larger g, the larger becomes the critical number of individuals from
which on appropriative behavior is ﬁnally reduced. If g ∈ [1,2] the individuals
unambiguously increase their appropriative behavior if the population increases.
• This implies that for an increase in the population and g ∈ (0,1), aggregate
utility is ﬁrst decreasing and then increasing. It is unambiguously increasing if
g ≥ 1.
• Individual utility is decreasing in the number of individuals if g ≤ 1. However, if
g > 1 there exists a critical size of the population below which individual utility
is decreasing and from which on individual utility is increasing.
11It is straightforward to show that, for b = 0 (there exists no conﬂict in the economy), limn→∞ v =
0,g < 1;Z,g = 1,∞,g > 1 and limn→∞ W = Z,g = 0,∞,g > 0, which replicates the repugnant
conclusion in its standard formulation for g ≤ 1.
163.2 Contest 2
In this section we analyze how the results of the last section change if individuals face
a trade-oﬀ between appropriation and production of the rent. From (7), an increase in
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> 0. (9c)
In the second contest appropriative investment is independent of g when competitors
can directly inﬂuence the size of the rent from (9a). The result is explained by the
fact that an increase in g results in higher marginal revenue of investments. However,
the increase in marginal costs exactly oﬀsets the eﬀects of an increase in g, leaving
the marginal rate of transformation between appropriative and productive activities
unaﬀected. Since these activities are independent of g, the increase in the gross prize
caused by the increase in g is equal to the increase in the net prize, which is equally
divided among competitors in equilibrium.
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(1 + b(n − 1))2 (g(1 + b(n − 1)) − bn). (10c)
It follows from (10a) that an increase in n intensiﬁes aggressiveness. The intuition is
that productive investments create a positive externality for other competitors in an
anarchic economy: the individuals internalize the total (marginal) costs of production
(in terms of foregone appropriation of the already existing rent), but get only a fraction
of the (marginal) surplus, (which is equal to 1/n in equilibrium). Clearly, the associ-
ated free-rider problem is the more severe the larger is the number of individuals. In
other words, the marginal rate of transformation between appropriative and productive
17activities (in absolute terms) is an increasing function of the number of competitors,
which implies that aggressiveness is intensiﬁed if the population increases.
As in the previous section, we next analyze two benchmark cases, g = 0 and g = 1,











(1 + b(n − 1))2 ≥ 0.
The indirect utility of the individuals is weakly decreasing in n. It remains constant
in the case where b = 0, which implies that individual net utility is independent of the
number of agents. However, b > 0 implies that v is decreasing in n. Aggregate utility
is constant at b = 1, hence, individual utility has to decrease. By the same token,
individual utility decreases as long as aggregate utility increases by less than one unit
per individual. The increase in aggregate utility is smaller than one for all b > 0 since
each agent devotes more time to appropriative activities. Aggregate utility is weakly
increasing in n because the potential increase in additional wealth is not completely
oﬀset by a reallocation of investments. Only b = 1 gives that aggregate utility is not
increasing with the number of individuals.
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(1 + b(n − 1))2 ≤ 0.
Indirect utility is unambiguously decreasing if the number of individuals has no eﬀect
on total production. At b = 0 agents choose to invest in productive activities only, but
total production is independent of the number of agents and has to be shared among
a larger number of individuals. This also implies that aggregate utility is independent
of n in this case. If b > 0 there are appropriative as well as productive activities,
but it follows from (10a) that appropriation is increasing in the number of individuals.
Therefore, it is not only that the potential production has to be shared among a larger
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Figure 5: Impact of the rent eﬀect (RE) and the appropriation eﬀect (AE) on aggre-
gate utility in contest 2.
are devoted to appropriation. This implies that individual utility and aggregate utility
is decreasing in n.
We now turn to the general eﬀects. (10c) can again be divided into a rent and
an appropriation eﬀect, (RE − AE) ng−1/(1 + b(n − 1))2. Following the line of argu-
mentation of the last section, the rent eﬀect is equal to RE = g(1 − b + bn) whereas
the appropriation eﬀect is equal to AE = bn. The graph of the rent eﬀect starts at
(1 + b)g > 0 for n = 2 and has a slope of gb. The graph of the appropriation eﬀect
starts at 2b > 0 and has a slope of b. Hence, the slope of the rent eﬀect exceeds the
slope of appropriation eﬀect if and only if g > 1. In this case, (b+1)g −2b > 0, which
implies that W is monotonically increasing in n. By the same token, if g < 1 and
(b + 1)g − 2b > 0, contrary to contest 1 we get an interior maximum for W. This case
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Figure 6: Impact of the rent eﬀect (RE) and the appropriation eﬀect (AE) on indi-
vidual utility in contest 2.
Result 4. a. If g = b = 0, or g = b = 1, ∂W
∂n = 0.
b. If b = 0 and g ∈ (0,2], or b ∈ (0,1) and g ∈ [1,2], or b = 1 and
g ∈ (1,2], ∂W
∂n > 0.
c. If b ∈ (0,1) and g ∈ [0, 2b
1+b), or b ∈ (0,1) and g = 2b
1+b, or b = 1 and
g ∈ [0,1), ∂W
∂n < 0.
d. If b ∈ (0,1) and (i) g ∈ [ 2b
1+b,1), ∂W
∂n = 0 ⇔ n =
(1−b)g
(1−g)b,
(ii) g ∈ ( 2b
1+b,1), ∂W
∂n ≷ 0 ⇔ 2 ≤ n ≶
(1−b)g
(1−g)b.
Proof: The result follows immediately from (10c). One can use (10c) to show that
∂W/∂n R 0 for n Q ¯ n ≡ (1 − b)g/((1 − g)b). The resulting level of ¯ n is only larger
or equal to 2 if and only if g ≥ 2b/(1 + b). The term on the right-hand side of the
inequality is smaller or equal to 1 from b < 1. In the other case, n ≥ 2 is a binding
restriction. ￿
In order to analyze the eﬀect of n on individual utility we again decompose (10b)
into a rent and a appropriation eﬀect, RE = (g − 1)(1 − b + bn), AE = bn. The
relationship is displayed in Figure 6. The graph of the rent eﬀect starts at (b+1)(g−1) R
0 ⇔ g R 1 for n = 2 and has a slope of (g − 1)b R 0 ⇔ g R 1. The appropriation
eﬀect starts at 2b > 0 and has a slope of b. Hence, the slope of the appropriation eﬀect
exceeds the slope of rent eﬀect for all g ∈ [0,2). If g = 2, both slopes are the same.
20The example in the ﬁgure has the following structure. For the case g < 1 it follows
immediately that the marginal utility is smaller than zero. If g > 1 we have assumed
that (b − 1)(g − 1) − 2b > 0, which implies that the marginal utility is positive for
small and negative for large n. Again this shows that we get an interior value for the
utility-maximizing population size. The general eﬀect of a change of n on v is:
Result 5. a. If g = 1 and b = 0, or g = 2 and b = 1, ∂v
∂n = 0.
b. If g ∈ (1,2) and b = 0, or g = 2 and b ∈ [0,1),
∂v
∂n > 0.
c. If g ∈ (1,2) and b ∈ [0,1], or g = 1 and b ∈ (0,1], or g ∈ (1,2) and
1 + b −
2





d. If g ∈ (1,2) and (i) b ∈ (0, 2
3−g − 1], ∂v
∂n = 0 ⇔ n =
(1−b)g
(1−g)b,




∂n ≷ 0 ⇔ 2 ≤ n ≶
(1−b)g
(1−g)b.
Proof: The result follows immediately from (10b). In addition, one can use (10b) to
show that ∂v/∂n R 0 for n Q ¯ n = (g − 1)(1 − b)/((2 − g)b). The resulting level of ¯ n is
only larger or equal to 2 if and only if g ≥ (3b + 1)/(1 + b). ￿
As for contest 1 we ﬁnally turn to the analysis of the optimal number of individuals
in the contest. We will clarify the implications of Result 4 in the following discussion.
The next two corollaries follow straightforwardly from Results 4 and 5:
Corollary 3. a. If g > 1, the aggregate utility maximizing number of agents is n →
∞.
b. If g = 1 and (i.) b = 1 the aggregate utility maximizing number of
agents is n ∈ [2,∞) whereas for (ii.) b < 1 the aggregate utility
maximizing number of agents is n = 2.
c. If g < 1 and (i.) g > 2b/(1 + b) the aggregate utility maximizing
number of agents is n = (1 − b)g/(b(1 − g)), whereas for (ii.) g ≤
2b/(1+b) the aggregate utility maximizing number of agents is n =
2.
Corollary 4. a. If g ≤ 1, the utility-maximizing number of agents is n = 2.
b. If g > 1 and (i.) b ≥
g−1
3−g the utility-maximizing number of agents
is n = 2, whereas if (ii) b <
g−1
3−g the utility-maximizing number of
agents is n =
(b−1)(1−g)
b(2−g) .
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Figure 7: Comparison of changes in aggregate utility and individual utility in
contest 2.
Corollaries 3 and 4 show that there exists a conﬂict of interest between the individual
and the aggregate perspective in general. Figure 7 shows this diﬀerence. The parameter
space is divided in four diﬀerent areas. In area A, both, individual utility and aggregate
utility are maximized at n = 2. In area B individual utility is still maximized at n = 2,
but aggregate utility maximization requires n = (b − 1)g/(g − 1)b. In area C the
individual optimum is still unchanged, but maximization of aggregate utility requires
n → ∞. Finally, in area D the individual utility maximum yields n = (b − 1)(1 −
g)/(b(2 − g), whereas aggregate utility is maximized at n → ∞. This implies that
there exists a conﬂict of interest in areas B, C, and D. Only in area A g is suﬃciently
small and b is suﬃciently large that aggregate and individual utility maximization
coincide with respect to the resulting optimal number of individuals.
It is the externality created by productive activities that explains the result: start-
ing at n = 2 with a = b/(1 + b), an increase in the number of individuals increases
appropriation. Since a converges to 1 for n → ∞, the total time endowment is invested
in appropriation. If g is relatively large compared to b, an increase in n has a positive
eﬀect on individual utility. The reason is that the reduction of productive activities
is over-compensated by the increase in marginal productivity of these investments. If
b, however, is suﬃciently large, the reduction in productive investments immediately
over-compensates the increase in marginal productivity causing a net utility loss. If,
on the other hand, b is moderate but the number of competitors is large, the increase
in marginal productivity cannot over-compensate the decrease in productive invest-
22ments since g < 2. The implication is that there exists an interior optimal number of
individuals from the point of view of the single individual.
The ﬁnding extents the ﬁrst contest model in two respects. First, without contested
productive activities by the individuals, individual utility is decreasing if g < 1 and
may be either increasing or decreasing if g > 1. Extending the model by incorporating
productive investments reduces the extent to which size eﬀects are necessary in order
to create positive eﬀects of competition for the individual competitor. Second, we
have seen that there exists a u-curve eﬀect of increasing competitiveness if size eﬀects
are suﬃciently strong, whereas this eﬀect is inverted in the presence of productive
investments.
4 Conclusions
Population size matters for the extent of conﬂict in an anarchic society. However, it is
not population size alone that matters but also the associated eﬀects on productivity.
Our results suggest that the production technology as well as the conﬂict technology
are important explanatory factors for the implications of population size in anarchy. In
order to get a better understanding of the implications of our ﬁndings we will interpret
population growth as a continuous variable in the following.
If size eﬀects merely increase the stock of goods that can be distributed, our model
implies that for large size eﬀects individuals tend to either organize in very small or
very large groups (families and nations, respectively). If the initial group is small and
the group size has to be extended continuously, a growth trap may exist because of
the u-curved shape of individual utility in population size. As a consequence there
exists a collective-decision problem in anarchy that is similar to the one analyzed in
Grossman (1997). He argues that such a collective decision problem may explain the
emergence of a ruling elite that need not be benevolent but that is able to internalize
the externalities of decentralized defensive activities. The emergence of hierarchies can
be explained as a solution to the same type of problem in our model. Hence, according
to this view the transformation of hunter-gatherer societies into hierarchical societies
has two roots, suﬃcient size eﬀects and a collective decision problem. If size eﬀects
are small, however, it is optimal from an individual point of view to organize in small
units if possible, even if population growth would maximize aggregate utility.
23In the extended model with productive investments, size eﬀects may merely increase
the return from productive investments. If size eﬀects are suﬃciently small but still
large enough compared to the discriminatory power of the contest, our model implies
that there exists a ﬁnite group size larger than 2 that maximizes individual utility. This
ﬁnding can be interpreted as the formation of a non-hierarchical tribe or a village. The
mechanisms that are responsible for aggregate utility improvements if the group size
increases are comparable to those discussed in the literature on agglomeration (see
for example Krugman 1995), namely returns to scale or suﬃciently strong size eﬀects.
However, the counterbalancing eﬀect that explains a ﬁnite group size diﬀers in our ap-
proach. The literature on agglomeration focuses on transportation costs and crowding.
In contrast, our focus is on the incentives to engage in appropriative activities. As we
have demonstrated, appropriative activities are an alternative explanation for a ﬁnite
group size, even in the presence of global size eﬀects.
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